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 The Myth of a Dual-earner Society   
-New Policy Discourses in European Welfare States1 
 
Trine P. Larsen, Peter Taylor-Gooby & Johannes Kananen 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract: 
Mobilising the female workforce has been a political goal since the early 1990’s 
across Europe. National governments have promoted a range of policies intended to 
enhance the female employment rate under the broad headings of “reconciliation of 
work and family life” and “equal opportunities”. This paper reviews the recent 
welfare reforms intended to enhance women’s participation in paid work and 
considers how they are likely to be successful in promoting genuine equality in terms 
of policy outcome. After giving a brief overview of the female workforce and the 
national characteristic of welfare settlements in Spain, Germany, Sweden and the UK, 
the recent welfare reforms are assessed with respect to whether a change of national 
policy discourse towards a dual-earner society is present in the four countries. The 
paper concludes that in recent reforms a discourse, which relegates women to live a 
role of secondary rather than equal worker has tended to predominate, mainly, 
because emphasis has been on work-life balance policies, intended to enhance the 
female employment rate in order to promote economic growth. Policies aimed at 
promoting equal opportunities for men and women in the labour market and informal 
sector in order to advance social justice have received much less attention. As a 
result, the underlying ideals and perceptions of gender relations within recent reforms 
have not been transformed and governments fail to create incentives for an equal 
sharing of the carer and provider role. Despite the failures of promoting a dual-
earner discourse, current perceptions of women in society are transforming and may 
imply gradual convergence across Europe. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1 Introduction 
Mobilising the female workforce was seen by national governments and the EU as the 
way to combat the challenges of economic recession, rising unemployment rates, 
demographic changes and escalating social expenditure costs that occurred during the 
early 1990’s. Women were seen as a hidden workforce that could take up newly 
created jobs and help release the pressure on the welfare states (Rees, 1998, p.178). 
Indeed, new policies were needed to pursue such a policy goal, since much welfare, 
gender contracts and labour market policy was based on the male breadwinner model 
(Rees, 1998, p.179). This paper reviews the recent welfare reforms intended to 
enhance women’s participation in paid work and considers how far they are likely to 
be successful in promoting genuine equality in terms of policy outcome. It concludes 
that in recent reforms a discourse that relegates women to live a role of secondary 
rather than equal worker has tended to predominate. An important reason for this is 
that national governments have mainly emphasised the political agenda regarding 
policies on work-life balance issues, aiming at mobilising the female workforce. The 
political agenda that includes policies aimed at promoting equal opportunities for men 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: this article draws on the work of the EC Project 'Welfare Reform and the 
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and women in the labour market as well as in the informal care sector have received 
much less attention. By neglecting the political agenda of equal opportunities, 
national governments fail to legitimise their dual-earner discourse, as they have not 
managed to change the underlying ideals and perceptions of gender relations within 
their own policies and society and thereby failed to create incentives for an equal 
sharing of the provider and carer role. As a result, national policies continue to 
support a working pattern in which women are secondary workers rather than promote 
a dual-earner society, which is a prerequisite for a successful mobilisation of the 
female workforce.  
 
In the following, we first present a brief overview of the female workforce and the 
main characteristics of the welfare settlements across Europe. We then discuss 
contemporary theories regarding discourse theory before moving on to examine the 
most recent reforms within Spain, Germany, Sweden and the UK, as they represent f 
four distinct European welfare settlements with different breadwinner models (Orloff, 
2002, p.13-14).  
 
 
2 The Female Workforce and the National Characteristic of Welfare 
Settlements in Spain, Germany, Sweden and the UK  
Women’s labour market participation has risen remarkably in the EU over the last 
decades (see table 1). 56 per cent were in paid work in 2002, representing an average 
increase of more than 10 percentage point in the EU since 1970. However, the rising 
employment rates are merely a reflection of quantity rather than quality, as most 
women work in low status jobs, often on a part-time basis, and earn on average 16 
percentage points less than men’s average gross hourly earnings (Eurostat, 12/11-
2003, see table 2). In addition, the main responsibility of domiciliary care continues to 
fall on women, although their working patterns have changed and recent attitude data 
indicate a desire for a more equal division of childcare and household chores among 
European citizens (European Value Study, 1999, p. 121, 139). Women are twice as 
likely as men to be involved in informal childcare and it is primarily women who 
reduce their workload or even leave the labour market during periods of childrearing 
(see table 1). The impact of children on women’s participation in paid work varies 
considerably across Europe while men’s employment rate is hardly affected by 
childcare responsibilities (see figure 1 and table 1).  
 
Figure 1: Gender and Labour Market Participation for women and Men, 
participation of those aged 15-64 as per cent of relevant population 
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Mothers in the Nordic countries and France mainly work full-time, while in Britain 
and most continental countries they tend to be in part-time employment and in 
Southern Europe a large group of mothers remain outside the labour market. The 
different levels of national care services and entitlements may be an important reason 
for this variation in mothers’ employment rates, although national governments have 
to a varying degree tried to adjust and support the new family patterns emerging 
across Europe by promoting extensive “women-friendly” policy programmes (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, p. 50ff).  
 
The national attempts represent a move away from the traditional male-
breadwinner/female housewife model, where access to national insurance, public 
benefits, health service and pensions were originally based on the assumption of 
men’s wages equalling a family wage, leaving women’s welfare and implicitly their 
civil rights to be mediated by their relationship with men (Orloff, 2002, p. 11). Within 
European countries, the transformation process towards a dual-earner society has 
important differences due to national traditions, including variations in the role of the 
state, cultural and political frameworks (Elingsæter, 2000, p. 61). When comparing 
dual-earner policies across Europe, Esping-Andersen (1999) divides European 
welfare states into three regime types; the liberal, conservative and social democratic, 
and potentially a fourth welfare regime representing Southern Europe, as Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece are considerably more family centred than Continental Europe 
with respect to public provision of care services and strong kinships (Esping 
Andersen, 1999, p.90-94). The Continental and Southern regime models are, 
therefore, categorised as more “familiaristic” regimes while the liberal and the 
Scandinavian regime types are classified as ‘de-familaristic’ regimes, because 
dependence on kinship for caring and household tasks are eased either by state or 
market provisions (Esping Andersen, 1999, p. 51). This regime division has been 
criticised as gender blind, neglecting informal work done by women, as the concept of 
citizenship is based on access to paid work, which predominantly relates to men 
(Wehner & Abrahamson, 2003, p.4). Several attempts have tried to incorporate the 
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gender dimension into Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typologies while other 
scholars have developed alternative models, using gender as the focal point 
(Ellingsæter, 1998, p. 61).  
 
By combining Esping-Andersen’s four welfare regimes with the empirical data 
mentioned earlier, it becomes evident that four distinctive welfare regimes with a 
different constellation of the breadwinner model occur with respect to Germany, 
Spain, Britain and Sweden. The German corporatist model relies on the reciprocity of 
the male breadwinner and female carer and have only limited care services, but high 
levels of social transfers to mothers leaving the labour market during periods of 
childrearing; the Spanish welfare state centres around the services provided by the 
family due to strong kinship ties and a weak welfare states; the British market-
orientated model relies on a non-interventionist family policy with targeted assistance 
towards poor families and children at risk, leaving it to the market and informal sector 
to provide care services; while the Swedish welfare state with its heavily child-
orientated policies and emphasis on gender equality represent to a large extent a dual-
earner society (Ghysels, 2003, p. 2; Perrons, 1995, p.103-105).  
 
The national family policies may be an important reason why to varying degrees 
families in Britain, Spain, Germany and Sweden continue to employ a traditional 
pattern of dividing work and caring tasks during periods of childrearing. Indeed, 
fathers’ take up rate of parental leave is relatively lower than their female counterpart 
in all four countries. Thus, 42 per cent of Swedish fathers use their rights to parental 
leave while the take up rate is much lower in Britain (24 per cent) and less than 1.5 
per cent in Germany (Riksförsäkringsverket, 2003; Eironline, 1998, DTI & DFEE, 
2000, p. 21). The main reasons put forward by many parents for adopting traditional 
gender roles range from lack of economic incentives, minimal statutory rights for 
paternity leave, fathers’ concerns about job security, negative attitudes in the 
workplace towards leave, lack of affordable childcare to individual perceptions 
(Sundstrom & Duvander, 1999, p. 18-22, LO 8/02-2001, DTI & DFEE, 2000, p. 22, 
Bothfeld, 2003, Leira, 2002, p.92). Before examining whether policy-makers in 
Sweden, Germany, Spain and the UK have addressed these issues in their recent 
reforms and thereby designed policies, which support a dual-earner society, the 
following section presents a theoretical framework for assessment. 
 
 
3 Changing National Policy Discourses  
Discourse theory offers an alternative way of analysing policy-making processes 
compared with institutionalism and rational choice approaches. By contrast to the 
latter approaches, which tend to focus on the impact of institutions, interests and 
power-games, discourse theory concentrates on ‘the role of meaningful social 
practices and ideas in political life’ (Howarth, 1995, p. 115). Instead of giving a rather 
static picture of the policy-making process, discourse analysis incorporates a more 
dynamic perspective, as it is capable of explaining radical changes within national 
policy-making (Schmidt, 2002, p. 209). Based on the assumption that cognitive and 
normative aspects play an essential role in policy-makers understanding of the world, 
discourse analysis is able to explain the emergence of policy change, since such social 
constructions can change over time, partly through interaction with other people, and 
partly through a process of social learning (Surel, 2002, p. 1).  
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A policy discourse is defined as ‘what people say to one another and to the public in 
their efforts to generate and legitimise a policy programme’ (Schmidt, 2002, p. 210). 
It is the underlying policy discourse or paradigm that determines the policy outcomes, 
as it frames the national policy discussion by representing the sum of key actors’ 
values and ideas with regard to the key problems, policy concepts and norms, the 
methods and policy instruments used along with the objectives and ideals underlying 
the specific policy programme (Schmidt, 2002, p. 213-214, Surel, 2002, p.3; Hall, 
1993 p. 279).  
 
National policy-making can be seen as a process of social learning, which is 
influenced by the involved actors’ interests, their ideas, perceptions, and the 
institutional framework including past decisions and the rules of the political game 
(Hall, 1993, p. 275; Surel, 2002, p. 1). Introducing new policy programmes aimed at 
fully mobilising the female workforce proves extremely difficult, as national policy-
making mainly relies on past decisions and policy procedures rather than changes in 
social and economic conditions (Hall, 1993, p. 277). Therefore, the success of 
mobilising the female workforce depends on national governments’ ability to both 
convince key actors about the need for intervention and the efficiency of the proposed 
policies as well as to satisfy them and the general public that the proposed policies 
respond to real problems in ways that are in correspondence with national values 
(Schmidt, 2002, p. 221). With respect to national values these are here defined as 
policy-makers and the general public’s perceptions regarding the division of the 
provider and caring role.  
 
The task of the policy discourse is to promote cognitive and normative arguments, 
which justify and legitimate the government’s policy programme (Schmidt, 2002, p. 
221). A policy discourse has therefore a cognitive and normative function, which can 
be seen as two separate political agendas. The former justifies the policy programme 
by highlighting the key problems and providing efficient solutions to current and 
potential future problems and defines the methods and policy instruments used. The 
normative function sets the political goals and ideals and serves to legitimise the 
policy programme by demonstrating its appropriateness in terms of following or 
transforming pre-existing national values (Schmidt, 2002, p.213-221). Applying 
Vivien Schmidt’s logic to national policies aimed at mobilising the female workforce, 
two political agendas appear, each representing cognitive and more normative 
founded aspects. The first agenda consists of more cognitive orientated policies, 
enabling women, particularly mothers to reconcile work and family life and thereby 
intended to enhance women’s participation into paid work in order to improve 
national productivity, growth and competitiveness. The second agenda relates to equal 
opportunities policies that encourage both women and men to a more equal sharing of 
the provider and caring role in order to advance social justice. It exemplifies attempts 
to transform policy-makers’ and the general public’s ideological perceptions from the 
male breadwinner/female housewife model towards a dual-earner society where both 
men and women are seen as equal workers and carers.  
 
The extent to which a change of national policy discourse towards a dual-earner 
society is present within recent national reforms depends on policy-makers’ ability to 
implement the two political agendas. In relation to this, commentators draw attention 
to three types of changes in policy discourses; a first order change, which renews the 
existing policy programme by modifying the policy instruments in use; a second order 
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change that recasts the policy programme by altering the policy instruments and 
policy objectives: a third order change which represents a radical approach by 
changing the policy instruments, objectives and the underlying ideology (Schmidt, 
2002, 222-223; Hall, 1993, p. 278, see table 3). It is only if a transformation of the 
pre-existing national values (the underlying ideals) takes place that a radical change of 
the policy discourse, e.g. a dual-earner discourse, will occur, as the policy programme 
otherwise will continue to reinforce the existing discourse, which in this case is the 
male breadwinner model (Schmidt, 2002, p. 221). Such a transformation is evident if 
policy-makers’ perceptions have changed from following the male breadwinner 
model to support a dual-earner model and the new policies incorporate measures to 
promote a more equal sharing of the provider and carer roles. If policy makers’ 
perceptions have not been transformed and the policies do not address gender 
equality, the reforms only have the characteristic of a first and second order degree 
change (see table 3), as they will continue to reinforce the traditional male 
breadwinner discourse rather than support the emergence of a dual-earner society.  
 
In the following sections we first briefly review national governments’ justification of 
the reforms and their overarching political goal. We then analyse the policies 
including the political activities in Spain, Sweden, Germany and the UK with respect 
to the two political agendas: ‘reconciliation of work and family life’ - and ‘equal 
opportunities issues’.  
 
4 Recent national policy reforms 
During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s European states faced similar challenges in 
terms of economic recessions, rising unemployment rates, demographic changes and 
escalating social expenditure costs. The most important issues concerned the cost of 
pensions, health and social services for older people, the costs of high levels of 
unemployment and changes in family patterns (Pierson, 2001, p. 99). Mobilising the 
female workforce was seen by national governments and the EU as a way to respond 
to these new challenges, as women represented a hidden workforce, which could take 
up newly created jobs and help release the current pressure on the welfare states due 
to the low female employment rate (COM94(333final), section V; COM(93)551; 
Rees, 1998, p.178). Driven by economic concerns national governments agreed to set 
a common target for the female employment rate at the 2000 Lisbon Summit 
(Presidency Conclusions, 2000). By 2010 the political goal is that 60 per cent of 
women should be in employment. This called for a new construction of national 
gender contracts; labour market and welfare policy, as much current policy was based 
on the male breadwinner/female carer model. As a result, few countries had the 
services in place for promoting a dual-earner society (Rees, 1998, p. 179). The wide 
range of recent reforms aimed at mobilising the female workforce in Spain, Sweden, 
Germany and the UK may represent attempts of such a transformation.  
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4.1 Agenda One -Work-life balance reforms in Spain, Sweden, Germany and 
the UK2   
The work-life balance reforms in Spain, Sweden, Germany and the UK comprise of 
various policies under the broad headings of parental leave, flexible working, social 
transfers for families with caring responsibilities for children and improvements of 
national childcare facilities. The more specific national initiatives are examined below 
with respect to whether they represent a change of policy discourse.   
 
4.1.1 Parental leave and flexible working  
Parental leave for both mothers and fathers, rights to take time off from work in 
emergency situations to care for a sick child and a request to work part-time have 
been implemented in all four countries, as a result of EU’s directives on parental leave 
(1996), maternity leave (1992) and part-time work (1998). Recent national reforms 
have improved the length and parents’ entitlement to parental leave, partly as a 
response to EU’s requirements, and partly because of national initiatives to improve 
the incentives for women to take up paid work (Interview TUC, Eironline 1998, 
Sveriges Riksdag, 1999/2000). The most radical reforms have been in the UK and 
Spain where flexible working and new rights for both parents have been introduced 
while the reforms in Sweden and Germany have been of a more moderate character, 
as extensive parental leave systems were already in place in these two countries (see 
table 4). Despite the recent national improvements, parents’ entitlements continue to 
vary across Europe. The Swedish government have in line with the Scandinavian 
model relied on a more universal founded approach, making the Swedish parental 
leave system one of the most generous systems in terms of paid leave and fathers’ 
rights to leave. Although fathers’ rights have improved in Germany with respect to 
parental leave, the new reforms continue to follow the traditions of a conservative 
regime, as paternity leave remains a non-statutory right and the financial incentives 
for fathers’ to use their rights remain poor. The Spanish and British reforms can be 
regarded as only modest improvements and reflect both the liberal and more Southern 
European approach, partly because fathers’ rights to leave are limited, and partly 
because parental leave is unpaid.  
 
Despite the national differences, recent national reforms show an increasing emphasis 
on fathers’ rights, which is a relatively new phenomenon in all four countries. Indeed, 
the new policy instruments indicate a change of national discourse towards a dual-
earner society, as focus has moved from purely mothers’ rights to maternity and 
parental leave to include similar rights for fathers’. However, the recent parental leave 
policies continue to be aimed mainly at women. Paternity leave is either non-existent 
or limited to a minimum of two days to a maximum of two months, which is in stark 
contrast to the much longer maternity leave rights. Moreover, parental leave is often 
unpaid or poorly funded in the four countries, whereby the financial incentive for 
families to employ a more equal sharing of the provider and carer role during periods 
of childrearing is reduced, as men’s earnings often are much higher than their female 
counterpart  (Siim, 1992, p. 33). National governments’ failure to address the issue of 
equal rights and improve the economic incentives implies that recent policies continue 
                                                 
2 This section draws heavily on the work of the German team (Frank Boenker, Andreas Aust & 
Hellmut Wollman), Swedish/Finnish Team (Virpi Timonen & Olli Kangas), the Spanish team (Ana 
Arriba & Louis Moreno) and the British Team (Trine P. Larsen, Peter Taylor-Gooby & Anne 
Daguerre) in carrying out interviews and preparing policy reviews. 
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to follow the logic of a male breadwinner/female carer ideology rather than a dual-
earner model despite the acknowledgement of fathers’ rights. This traditional way of 
thinking also dominates the national debates behind the reforms.  
 
The political debate in Sweden shows a change of attitudes towards a dual-earner 
society. In the early 1970’s only few feminists within the Social democratic party 
advocated for restricting periods of the parental leave scheme to fathers while this 
position is now widely accepted by most political actors (Leira, 1992, Timonen, 
2003). However, the latest debates centred around the low take up rate of ‘daddy 
leave’ imply that this remains highly controversial. The proposal launched by the 
Social Democratic Minister of Equality, Margareta Winberg, to divide parental leave 
equally between men and women was rejected by most political parties, particularly 
the Christian Democrats, the employers associations, trade unions and even the 
general public, as it interferes with families’ rights to decide how to organise their 
caring tasks (Jönsson, 2002, p.4; Interview; Social Democrats). The Liberals’ 
(Folkpartiet’s) idea of introducing a bonus to families sharing the parental leave 
equally was rejected on similar grounds (Jönsson, 2002, p.4). Despite the disputes 
over how to increase fathers’ take up rate, national key actors acknowledge the need 
to design policies that encourage more fathers to take an active caring role in order to 
mobilise the female workforce. The latest proposal by the trade unions (TCO) is an 
example of this. They proposed to increase the thresholds for leave payments, as the 
current system reinforces traditional gender roles due to the lack of financial 
incentives for fathers to take leave (Interview; TCO). As part of its 2002 election 
campaign, the social democratic government promised to increase the income ceilings 
for similar reasons, but employers (Svensk Naeringsliv) may renege on this promise, 
as it also means rising thresholds for the sickness benefit (Timonen, 2003). Indeed, a 
change of attitudes towards a dual-earner society is seen in the political debates, 
although the attitudes of employers lag behind. Recent research indicates that not all 
employers accept that their male workers should use their rights to parental leave 
(Sundstrom & Duvander, 1999, p. 18-22). It indicates that the Swedish government 
have to some degree managed to transform the perceptions of key actors towards a 
dual-earner model. However, economic constraints, particularly employers’ 
reluctance to cover any extra costs seems to be the main barrier for achieving the goal 
of a dual-earner society.  
 
 
In the UK, reluctance from employers was also the main reason why the length of 
paid maternity leave was only extended to cover the first 26 weeks, paid paternity 
leave limited to two weeks, parental leave remained unpaid and flexible working 
hours only became a right on request. However, campaign organisations such as EOC, 
the Maternity Alliance, and trade unions represented by the TUC along with the New 
Labour government and the Liberal Democrats were in favour of more generous 
rights (Interviews with DTI, TUC, EOC, Standing Committee on Delegated 
Legislation (2/12-1999). Employers’ unwillingness to support more extensive rights 
to particularly fathers is not only due to rising costs and ‘red tape’, but also a matter of 
attitude. As a respondent expresses: 
 
‘The employers were not so opposed to extending the maternity leave than they 
were on improving parental leave. It is partly because some employers could not 
conceive that fathers might actually want to stay at home and look after their 
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children.[..]It (paternity leave) was much more opposed by employers than 
anything else’ (Interview; EOC).  
 
This traditional way of thinking shows that not all key actors’ perceptions regarding 
the male breadwinner model have been transformed despite a change of attitudes is 
becoming apparent within the British debates. The views of the Conservatives seem 
also to reflect this, as their fundamental belief is that childcare is a private matter. 
However, they also argued that any extensions of parental leave will create a ‘red tape 
burden’ for small business and thereby prevent economic growth (Guardian 17-9-
2000, Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation (2/12-1999). The political 
structure of Whitehall accounts for New Labours ability to ignore parliamentary 
opposition. However, the majoritarian system was not able to withstand the veto-
points put forward by the employers, questioning the strengths of the British political 
system. 
 
Similarly, the Germany government could not ignore the opposition of employers. 
Followed by intense debates in which trade unions and the women’s movement 
supported the government’s proposal for a right to part-time work, the government 
had to give concessions to the employers in other policy areas (discussed later on 
under section of gender equality issues), to gain support from the employers to 
implement the parental leave reforms (Bönker, Aust and Hellman, 2003, p. 43). 
Indeed, the support by employers seems crucial in the German debates, but 
convincing the opposition, particularly the Christian Democrats (CDU), is also 
important due to the structure of the political system. The current red-green coalition 
government does not have the majority in the second chamber and therefore relies on 
the support from the CDU to implement political reforms. The red green-coalition 
managed to gain support from the CDU to implement their parental leave reforms, 
which only introduced minor changes to the existing system introduced by the Kohl 
government in 1986, which was designed to reinforce the male breadwinner model 
rather than support a dual-earner society (Interview; CDU). However, since then, a 
slow reorientation process has started within the CDU, where the party’s views are 
changing from supporting the traditional gender pattern in which mothers are carers 
and housewives to a view that is more in line with the position of the red-green 
coalition. The red-green coalition sees parental leave as a right for both sexes and 
deems financial incentives important for mobilising the female workforce (Interview; 
CDU, SPD). Despite the recent changes, both parties continue to some extent to 
reinforce the traditional gender pattern, as paternity leave remains a non-statutory 
right and the policies continue to favour mothers as carers rather than parents sharing 
care due to the low levels of wage compensation for parents on parental leave. An 
important reason for this is the weak representation of women’s interests in 
parliament and trade unions, leaving it mainly to women’s organisations such as 
Deutche Frauenrat to advocate for both parents rights (Interviews with CDU, SPD and 
Ministry of Family, Older People, Women and Youth).  
 
Similarly, the employers association (CEOE) also played an important role in the 
political debates in Spain. Trade unions (CC.OO and UGT) proposed an extension of 
paid leave for family reasons including a four-week paternity leave scheme following 
the same conditions as for the maternity leave, but the employers association (CEOE) 
rejected these proposals. They stated that such measures would affect the prerogative 
of employers’ rights; and might result in discrimination of female employees. 
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Following the line approved by employers, the government and later political parties 
adopted the new parental leave entitlements in 1999 (eiroline, 2003). Despite 
employers’ opposition, a change of attitudes can be seen among the key actors. The 
political parties particularly the Socialist Party (PSOE) have recently acknowledged 
along with the trade unions the need for extending father’s rights. The Socialists has 
three times proposed laws on paternity leave rights in Parliament, but their proposals 
have each time been rejected by the current PP government due to their majority in 
Parliament (Salido, 2002, p.30, Interview; El Pais). Indeed, this shows that many 
political actors continue to follow the logic of a one-earner society. The weak 
representation of women at the boards of political parties and trade unions accounts 
for the low profile of parental leave policies (eironline, 2003; International reform 
monitor, 2003).  
 
Overall the analysis of recent parental leave reforms signify both a first and second 
order change, as new policy instruments have been introduced and the political goal 
has been to mobilise the female workforce. However, national governments have to 
varying degrees failed to transform the underlying ideals of the male breadwinner 
model. Thus, a greater awareness of men’s rights and the need for promoting financial 
incentives is present. As a result, the national reforms cannot be classified as a third 
order degree change and thereby a new dual-earner discourse. In addition, the analysis 
indicates that the reluctance from employers to enhance the economic incentives and 
fathers’ rights to leave have been determining factors for the policy outcomes while 
national governments to varying degree have been able to ignore parliamentary 
opposition due to the structure of the national political systems.  
 
4.1.2 Social Transfers  
Social transfer is another key tool used to help families reconcile work and caring 
responsibilities. It comprises of various tax exemptions and benefits that enables 
parents to reconcile work and family life. Recent reforms in the UK, Sweden, Spain 
and Germany have been particularly aimed at the less well-off families, mainly using 
targeted support based on means-testing rather than universal benefits (see table 5). 
However, there are important differences in the ways national governments have 
addressed the help aimed at mobilising the female workforce. The new reforms in 
Sweden and Germany have followed the traditions of the Nordic and conservative 
regimes as their policies mostly adjusted the national social benefit systems by 
extending the existing thresholds for family and childcare allowances and increasing 
benefit levels. By contrast, the reforms, introduced in the UK and Spain, have 
primarily targeted working families through means-tested tax exemptions rather than 
social benefits, and rely therefore on the more residual approach that characterises the 
liberal and Southern regime models.  
 
The new reforms imply a change of policy discourse in Spain, Britain and Sweden 
towards a dual-earner society, as the reforms main purpose is to encourage women, in 
particular mothers, to enter paid work by increasing the financial incentives. 
However, the British tax credit reforms contain financial disincentives for low-skilled 
women living with a partner to seek employment, as families’ may be caught in a 
benefit trap where their entitlements to financial support would decline while their 
income from paid work often do not equal this loss (Millar, 2004, p.69; Interview; UK 
expert on family issues). As result, the new reforms indirectly reinforce the traditional 
male breadwinner rather than support a dual-earner society. A similar criticism 
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applies to the German reforms, as the recent increases in the family allowance 
indirectly create financial incentives for mothers to stay at home rather than seeking 
employment (Interviews CDU, SPD). The new reforms indicate that the perceptions 
of policy actors, particularly in Germany and the UK, have not been transformed, as 
they continue to design policies, which reinforce the male breadwinner model. The 
political debates prior to the national reforms seem to support this.  
 
The German debates show that the increase in family allowances was a contentious 
issue. The women’s movement (Deutche Frauenrat) and feminists in the parliament 
argued against the increase due to the potential danger of reinforcing the male 
breadwinner/female carer model, as the allowance would be a disincentive for women 
to seek employment (Interviews with CDU, SPD, Ministry of Women, Family and 
Youth). By contrast, both the CDU and the coalition government represented by the 
Department for Women, Family and Youth favoured an increase in the family 
allowances, as it would prevent unemployed to claim social assistance because of 
their children (Interview; SPD, CDU). However, the purpose of the reform differs 
among the political parties. The coalition government’s overall aim was to link the 
child-rearing benefits to employment and make it a worker’s right while the CDU saw 
it as a way to reduce childcare costs, as children could be cared for at home (Morgan 
& Zippel, 2003, p.59; Interview; CDU). Indeed, this states that not all key actors’ 
perceptions regarding the male breadwinner model have been transformed. The 
national debates also imply that the reform was not designed for mobilising the 
female workforce, but was instead a way to reduce the number of people seeking 
unemployment benefits and even to some extent fortify traditional gender roles. 
 
The new reforms were also controversial in Britain. National experts on family issues 
argued that the new reforms could prevent low-skilled women living with a partner 
from seeking employment. For the second partner of a couple to seek employment the 
financial incentives are almost non-existent or even discouraging due to benefit traps. 
As a response the New Labour government introduced a specific tax exemption of 
£2500 for dual-earner households, which improves only little the economic incentives 
for the second partner to seek employment (Interview; British expert on family 
issues). Despite the criticism and requests for other changes in the government’s 
proposals, trade unions, women’s movements, employers associations all welcomed 
the new tax credits, as they saw it as a valuable incentive to work (Women’s Budget 
Group 2000, 2001; CBI, 2000; TUC16/11-2001). By contrast, the Liberal Democrats 
and the Conservatives were highly sceptical. The Liberal Democrats called for 
simplification, as they feared that the new system would to complex and deter 
claimants from applying (Liberal Democrats, 19/11-2001). The Conservatives on the 
other hand opposed the way child-rearing benefits were linked to employment. They 
proposed instead a new Married Couple’s Allowance for families with children, 
which to a large extent follow their view of childcare being a private matter as the 
proposal enables one parent to care for their children in the home (Conservatives, 
31/5-2001). Although, the New Labour government was able to ignore the opposition 
due to the structure of the political system, it clearly demonstrates that not all key 
actors are convinced that a dual-earner model is the way forward.   
 
A similar disagreement regarding the way to support families with children has been 
an ongoing issue in the Swedish debates, although, there is a consensus among all 
Swedish political parties, trade unions, employers associations and women’s 
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movements to support families with children, as it enables all children to have similar 
living conditions and rights (Interview; Left Party; Wennemo, 2/4-2000). It is 
particularly the Christian Democrats and the right wing parties, who favour policies 
that enable parents, particularly mothers to care for their children in the home while 
the Social Democrats strongly supported by the trade unions and women’s 
movements oppose such policies, as they reinforce traditional gender roles and 
exclude women from paid work (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2003, p 1). However, in the 
early 1970’s the position of the Social Democrats was not as clear-cut, which 
indicates a change of attitudes within the party. It was mainly the trade unions (TCO 
and LO) that then opposed the home care allowance, as this enabled parents, in 
particular mothers, to stay home and care for their children. The home care allowance 
was strongly favoured by centre-right parties while the Social Democrats, despite 
their official negative stand, internally disagreed over this position (Hiilamo & 
Kangas, 2003, p. 6-8). The latest debate over the home care allowance is the Social 
Democrats withdrawing the home care allowance introduced by the centre-right 
government in 1994 when they came into power in 1995 (Leira, 2002, p. 114). 
Indeed, disputes still exist regarding the purpose of linking social transfers to paid 
work, as in particular centre-right political parties continue to favour home care 
allowances and thereby indirectly support traditional gender roles. The Social 
Democrats have therefore not managed to transform perceptions of all policy-makers. 
 
In the case of Spain, the new social transfers introduced in the 2003 Personal Income 
Tax Reform have also been subject to intense debates, particularly with respect to 
whether the reform actually improved work incentives for low paid families. The 
reactions of the trade unions have been a total rejection of the reform, as the proposed 
tax allowances for children, the family and women conflict with progressive nature of 
taxations reforms, since these favour high-income families, as low paid are 
disregarded from making tax declarations and therefore do not benefit (eiroline, 
2003b). The employers on the other hand supported the government’s reform, as it is 
‘a step forward towards a tax model that favours growth and economic recovery in 
Spain’ (eiroline, 2003b). Despite the lack of financial incentives within the tax 
reforms to help low-paid workers, national political parties have also proposed new 
family friendly policies, which raise child-rearing allowances and thereby enable 
parents, particularly women, to combine work and family life. The opposition party 
(The socialists) unveiled their intention of giving women a one-off payment of 3000 
euros for their first child as part of their election manifesto while the current 
government has agreed to give women 1200 euros for giving birth to a third child 
(Casels, 1/8-2002). Indeed, the political initiatives represent a new momentum in 
Spanish politics, although it is debatable whether the new policies are merely aimed at 
rising fertility rates rather than supporting female employees (Moreno, forthcoming).  
 
In sum, the national reforms regarding social transfers indicate a first order degree 
change as most of the new policy instruments enable parents, particularly mothers to 
combine work and family life. However, many of the reforms lack financial 
incentives for mothers to seek employment and particularly in Germany and Britain 
the reforms might have the opposite effect once implemented. As a result, the new 
reforms do not always support the overall goal of mobilising the female workforce. In 
addition, the Spanish and German reforms may be driven by other concerns e.g. rising 
fertility rates and reducing unemployment levels rather than supporting a dual-earner 
society. Therefore, it is only in Sweden and the UK a second order degree change can 
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be detected. Moreover, national governments have to a varying degree failed to 
transform the underlying ideals of the male breadwinner model, as many national 
policy-makers continue to support social transfers, which enable particularly women 
to stay home and care for their children. As a result a third order change and thereby a 
dual-earner discourse has not been legitimised. Nevertheless, national governments 
have been able to adopt policies, which aim at promoting female employment despite 
national opposition. The structures of the national political systems are important 
reasons for this. In Britain, the majoritarian system account for the lack of veto-points 
in the political debates while the large number of seats held by the Swedish Social 
Democrats enables them to ignore the centre-right requests (Talylor-Gooby, 2001, p, 
148; Timonen, 2001, p 30). The Spanish tendency for consensus politics and the fact 
that the right-wing party PP government has the majority in Parliament may be the 
reason for their ability to introduce new reforms while the German government’s 
ability to convince the CDU may be the reason for their success (Moreno, 2001, p. 
108, Arriba, 2003, Bonker & Aust, forthcoming).  
 
4.1.3 Childcare reforms 
In recent years, access to formal childcare has been a high profile issue on the 
political agenda of Germany, Sweden and the UK while such services only have 
received limited political attention, since the introduction of universal pre-school 
education for children aged 3-6 years in 1990 in Spain. However, Spanish politicians 
are becoming more aware of the issue due to public pressure and the government has 
recently set a target of 250.000 new childcare places by 2004 (Vidal & Valls, 2002, 
p.25-26, EU 2002, p. 14). The different national initiatives in Sweden, Germany, 
Spain and the UK have been to develop the national childcare infrastructure by giving 
children a right to a free childcare place although the length and entitlement to these 
services differs across the three countries (see table 6). Access to a full-time childcare 
place for children aged 3- 6 years is a right in Sweden while children in Germany, 
Spain and the UK only have the right for a part-time place. The financial support to 
cover parents’ childcare costs also differs in the four countries. A pre-school place is 
free in Spain while Sweden has the most generous means-tested thresholds and the 
German and British systems rely on residual support. The countries also rely on 
different approaches in their ways of providing childcare. The Spanish and British 
childcare market is based on a mixed economy while the local municipalities in 
Sweden and Germany provide childcare.  
 
Despite the national differences, the new initiatives particularly in Germany, Spain 
and Britain signify a change of policy discourse towards a dual-earner society, as 
provision of childcare traditionally in contrast to Sweden has been deemed a private 
matter. In Germany, family policy including childcare was for the first time presented 
as a governmental declaration by the Chancellor himself during the 2002 election 
campaign, implying the importance of the issue and a change of attitudes within 
German politics. Similarly, in Britain the national childcare strategy introduced by 
New Labour was also the first of its kind, breaking with the traditional view of 
childcare not being a public issue (Lewis, 2003). This increasing emphasis on 
childcare across the four countries clearly indicates a change of policy discourse 
towards a dual-earner society. The new direction is also reflected within the national 
debates.  
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Developing childcare services for children under the age of three is becoming an 
increasing issue for both left and right wing parties in Spain. However, childcare 
continues to have a low profile on the political agenda compared to other policy areas. 
Pressure from trade unions, employers, political parties and social movements to 
create public policy for small infants (aged 0-3) is practically non-existent and can 
mainly be explained by Francoism and a tendency to focus on compulsory education 
and benefits for the unemployed (Vidal & Valls, 2002, p. 25). In contrast, employers 
associations, trade unions, women’s movements and political parties in Germany, 
Sweden and the UK all acknowledge the need to expand the national childcare 
infrastructure to mobilise the female workforce. 
 
 In the German case, the CDU and SPD have revised their position from a 
reconsolidation of traditional gender roles in which rising levels of family allowance 
has been key to a more pro-working mother agenda that includes an expansion of 
childcare facilities. The employer association (BDA), the trade union (DGB) and the 
women’s movement (Deutche Frauenrat) have all supported this new direction 
proposed by the political parties. This consensus clearly indicates a change of ideals 
among the policy makers, as in the past the CDU has opposed any childcare reforms, 
resulting in two failed reforms regarding universal childcare rights and expansion of 
public care facilities (Bönker, Aust & Hellman, 2003). However, the tendency of the 
SPD to focus mainly on family benefits rather than childcare provision has along with 
local governments opposition to any attempts that curtail their authority and financial 
burden also prevented childcare expansions (Bönker & Aust, forthcoming). Despite 
their revised position regarding childcare expansion, the CDU’s initial agenda for the 
2002 election campaign, in contrast to the SPD, was to increase family allowance 
rather than expand childcare facilities, implying a support for the male breadwinner 
model. However, their main arguments were merely founded on administrative 
concerns rather than the idea of reinforcing traditional gender roles, as it is easier to 
implement family allowances at federal level than expand the childcare sector due to 
the political structure of the German welfare state (Interview; CDU). A change of 
ideals is seen among policy-makers and signifies a possible third order degree change. 
However, recent budget constraints in Germany may challenge the government’s 
ability to follow up on the newly emerging consensus regarding childcare, as 
Germany has exceeded the three percent public deficit rule in the EU’s Growth and 
Stability Pact (Interviews; CDU, SPD).  
 
Budget constraints are also a key concern in Sweden with respect to the recent 
childcare reform. The trade union (Kommunal forbundet) and the centre party in 
particular have criticised the government for not providing enough funding for the 
local authorities to implement the reform (Sveriges Rigsdag, 2000). Despite the 
criticism, employers associations, trade unions, women’s movements and most 
political parties expect for the Christian democrats have supported the new initiatives, 
as it enables all children access to a childcare place (Gustafsson, 23/10-2000; Sveriges 
Riksdag, 2000; Wennemo, 2/4-2000). The Christian democrats’ main concern was 
that families would spend less time together and the reform would therefore affect 
children’s well-being in a negative way (Sveriges Riksdag, 2000). Although, the 
Christian democrats follow the ideals of the male breadwinner model, the recent 
reform signifies a change of attitude among the key actors.  In the early 1970’s, it was 
mainly trade unions and the Social democrats who argued for expanding the childcare 
sector while today almost all political parties support formal childcare (Hiilamo & 
 15
Kangas, 2003, p. 6-8; Interviews: Liberals, TCO, Centre right party, Social 
Democrats). As a result, the Social Democratic government with respect to childcare 
has managed to a large extent to transform the perceptions of most policy-makers and 
have been able to legitimise a dual-earner discourse.  
 
A consensus regarding an expansion of childcare facilities is also present in the UK. 
In the early 1990’s, the Conservative government began to design policies aimed at 
expanding the formal childcare sector and thereby breaking with their traditional view 
of childcare being a private matter (Land & Lewis, 1998). Trade Unions, employers 
associations, the women’s movement and New Labour have also acknowledged the 
need for developing the childcare sector to improve the female employment rate 
(Interviews; TUC, EOC, government officials). However, disagreements exist 
between key actors regarding the way to raise the levels of affordable childcare. The 
Conservatives largely support a market-orientated approach, where only minimal state 
funded resources are used to expand the childcare market (Land & Lewis, 1998). 
Although New Labour officially favours a market approach in which childcare 
expansion is promoted through support to families and private providers rather than 
state run care facilities, internal disagreements exist within the party. Parts of the 
government have with the support of women’s organisations, think thanks and trade 
unions criticised this market-orientated approach as being insufficient and advocated 
for a more state funded approach while the employers are indifferent to the used 
approach as long as it excludes them (Interviews; EOC, TUC, officials in 
government). A compromise was reached between the different parts of the New 
Labour party within the 2002 Comprehensive Spending Review, as additional funding 
was allocated to set up state provided nurseries in deprived areas while supporting the 
market approach via the new tax credits. However, the debate is far from resolved. As 
a government official expresses it:  
 
“The new number of children’s centres is where you could say: this is the end of 
the story, which might be the Treasury’s view or you could say it is the middle of 
the story and what we now need to do is to roll this out.”  (Interview; government 
official). 
 
The British debate indicates a recent change of key actors perceptions regarding the 
male breadwinner model. For the first time the concept regarding defamilisation of 
childcare via the public sector has reached the political agenda and policy actors have 
started to advocate for improving childcare facilities (Land, 2003, p. 11).  
 
Overall the recent national reforms on childcare represents a change of discourse in 
terms of a second order change, as new policy instruments have been introduced and 
the political goal is to increase the employment rate of women. The political debates 
also signify a change of national actors’ mindset, implying a radical change of 
discourse towards a dual-earner society. However, the recent reforms on parental 
leave and social transfers in particular imply that such a change is still a distant goal. 
Key actors continue to follow the logic of the male breadwinner model rather than a 
dual-earner discourse due to the failure of national governments to transform key 
actors’ normative belief system. Nevertheless, a greater awareness of men’s rights and 
the need for increasing the financial incentives for both men and women is becoming 
apparent in the national debates. In addition, most national governments have even 
been able to implement their reforms despite parliamentary opposition due to the 
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structure of the national political systems. However, governments have been unable to 
ignore opposition of employers, implying that employers are veto-points in the 
political debates  
 
4.2 Second Agenda: Equal Opportunities Policies3 
The political agenda on equal opportunities have received much less attention within 
the national political debates, although national governments have implemented the 
agreed EU policies on equal opportunities, which include a range of initiatives from 
legislation on equal treatment, positive action measures to gender mainstreaming. The 
British government have largely ignored the practical dimension of these reforms. As 
a British respondent expresses:  
 
“We get told that they (the government) do not see sex discrimination as a major 
problem” (Interview EOC).  
 
By contrast, the issue of gender equality, particular eliminating gender segregation 
and improving financial incentives for equal sharing of the gender role, have been part 
of the German and Swedish and to some extent the Spanish political agenda. The new 
initiatives instigated by the German government is even classified by a respondent as 
paradigm shift, as she expresses:  
 
‘It was only in 1998, when the red-green coalition came into office that a major 
paradigm shift occurred in the sense that women’s employment and equality in 
the labour market should be achieved through explicit political actions [.] The 
paradigm shift is not only visible in terms of new aims and targets but also in the 
use of different instruments visible in the programme of women and profession 
(Interview; Ministry of Family, Older people, Women and Youth).  
 
 In the following, the more specific initiatives of civil rights for men and women, 
equal pay, gender mainstreaming including elimination of gender segregation are 
examined with respect to whether they represent a change of policy discourse.  
 
4.2.1 Civil Rights and Equal Pay 
The emphasis on fathers rights to parental leave and the greater awareness of the need 
to improve the financial incentives for families to employ a more equal sharing of the 
provider and caring role, imply that the national governments are beginning to address 
the issue of equal civil rights for men and women in their family policies. However, 
national governments have to a limited extent only addressed the most fundamental 
financial reason why families continue to follow traditional gender roles during 
periods of child-rearing. Eliminating wage differences between men and women by 
promoting equal pay have not been achieved in any of the member states despite EU’s 
1976 directive on equal pay. However, national differences exist with respect to the 
gender pay gap. The largest pay gap is seen in Germany and Britain (21 percentages 
points respectively) while the wage differences are narrower in Sweden (18 
percentages points) and Spain (15 percentages points). The incorporation of gender 
                                                 
3 This section draws heavily on the work of the German team (Frank Boenker, Andreas Aust & 
Hellmut Wollman), Swedish/Finnish Team (Virpi Timonen & Olli Kangas), the Spanish team (Ana 
Arriba & Louis Moreno) and the British Team (Trine P. Larsen, Peter Taylor-Gooby & Anne 
Daguerre) in carrying out interviews and preparing policy reviews. 
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issues in the Spanish collective agreements since 1994 and the Swedish government’s 
emphasis on eliminating gender discrimination have improved the situation in these 
two countries while it is lack of political attention that is the main reason why the pay 
gap continues to be wide in Britain (Rubery, et. al, 2002, p. 129). With respect to 
Germany, a respondent reports that the main reasons are that: 
 
‘Female work is not honoured in the same way as predominately male work. [..] 
Germany has missed a development for ideological reasons. The family ideal of the 
1950’s and 1960s are still alive in the thinking of the people [.] and one of the 
reasons why there has not been sufficient progress. The basic problem is still to 
change the mentality of the people’ (Interview; SPD). 
 
National government’s failure to transform the mentality of people is also evident in 
Britain, Sweden and Spain, as women continue to be paid less than men for the same 
job across Europe, implying that most policy-makers still to some extent believe that 
men’s work is worth more than women’s. Indeed, this demonstrates that national 
governments have been unable to legitimise the dual-earner discourse, which is a 
prerequisite for reaching the political goal of mobilising the female workforce.  
 
4.2.2 Gender Mainstreaming and Elimination of Gender Segregation 
Attempts to promote equal opportunities and eliminate gender segregation through 
gender mainstreaming have been more prevalent in national policies and debates. 
Although various projects are in place to secure gender mainstreaming and gender 
equality in all four countries, it is mainly in Sweden and Germany that these issues 
have also dominated the political agenda. The Swedish government is currently 
preparing a 121-progamme, which aims at making the public sector a better employer 
in terms of improving the quality of women’s work (Interview; the left party). In the 
German case, the red-green coalition government proposed the programme ‘women 
and profession’ in 1999, which among others included gender mainstreaming, 
elimination of gender segregation, reports on equal pay and an equality act aimed 
primarily at the private sector, as similar gender equality policies had already been 
implemented through legislation within the public sector during the 1990’s (Bönker, 
Aust and Hellman, 2003 p. 40). Indeed, the new initiatives instigated by German 
government represent a shift in the existing policy discourse, as neither the CDU nor 
the FDP have proposed similar legislative measures to regulate gender equality for the 
private sector during their times in office (Bönker, Aust and Hellman, 2003). 
 
The political debates and indeed the final results in Germany regarding the equality 
act indicate that not all key actors supported the new initiatives. Trade unions and the 
women’s movement (Deutche Frauenrat) strongly supported the government’s 
proposal while employers associations such as the BDA in particular opposed any 
legislative attempts to regulate gender equality within the private sector and even 
threatened to reject the government’s proposal for changing the parental leave system 
(Bönker, Aust and Hellman, 2003, p. XX). Some reluctance was also seen within the 
Office of the Chancellor with respect to the equality act, implying that perceptions of 
key actors have not been fully transformed. The results of the debate were that the 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, cancelled the legislative initiative for an equality act to 
achieve the employers support for the proposed changes of the parental leave system 
in July 2001 (Bönker, Aust and Hellman, 2003p. 40). Despite their view that 
voluntary methods proved insufficient to secure gender equality within the private 
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sector, the government replaced their proposal with a non-binding agreement between 
the government and employers associations in which exchange of best practice, 
positive action measures, gender mainstreaming and an improved framework for the 
infrastructure of childcare were included. The government promised not to legislate 
within the area, if the agreement was implemented successfully. Both trade unions 
and women’s organisations criticised the new changes and continued to call for 
legislative measures, but their voices were ignored. However, the debate is far from 
resolved. The Green party continued to support a gender equality act for the private 
sector during the 2002 election campaign and government officials are planning to 
incorporate parts of the rejected equality act when implementing new the EU anti-
discrimination directives (Interviews with CDU, SPD, BDA). Indeed, the debates 
demonstrate the failure of the red-green coalition government to transform the key 
actors perceptions regarding the importance of gender equality and thereby legitimise 
a dual-earner discourse. This seems also to be supported by the fact that a respondent 
reports: 
 
“Gender equality is still a soft issue, which is likely to be neglected in the overall 
policy approach. [] There have been some important developments at the party 
conferences, which agreed on a progressive agenda and it has also been possible 
to strengthen the issue in the Agenda 2010” (Interview; SPD). 
 
The political debates in Sweden are dominated by political parties, trade unions and 
women organisations all calling for new measures to eradicate gender pay gaps and to 
improve social transfers and the attitude at workplaces to foster equality for men and 
women. In addition, many key actors have also started to acknowledge a need to focus 
on enhancing the quality and not the quantity of women’s employment (Interview; left 
wing party, social democrat, TCO). However, the social democratic government has 
not yet made a concrete proposal, but is preparing a proposal for addressing these 
issues in the 121 programme. This clearly shows a change of attitude among the key 
actors, as it is only recently that greater awareness to women’s type of employment 
have reached the political agenda.  
 
Spanish politicians and experts also acknowledge the need to focus on quality rather 
than quantity of female employment as well as the need to remove mental barriers 
regarding gender equality through prevention and education from very early on 
(Interview; PP). The target of having 50 per cent of women in stable labour market 
jobs by 2001 (which was reached) is a clear indication of this (Arriba, 2003, p. 24). 
The more recent initiatives proposed by the trade unions (CC.OO and UGT) also 
imply an increasing emphasis on promoting equal opportunities, as the CC.OO and 
UGT confederations made a joint declaration in which they emphasised the need for 
eliminating gender segregation (European Industrial Relations observatory, 2003). 
Indeed, this indicates a change of attitudes from the traditional male breadwinner 
model, as the key actors are concerned with improving general gender equality issues 
to enhance women’s access to paid work. However, their concern is often not 
implemented in practice, as a respondent reports: 
 
“Policy on equal opportunities has major legislative backing and is supported by 
public spokespersons, but is not binding and there is no budget which backs these 
stimulating principles. We even reach the perverse situation of applying for projects 
 19
funded by equal opportunities to then cover quite different needs’ (Interview; Expert 
on gender equality). 
 
By contrast to the Swedish, German and Spanish political debates, the issue of gender 
segregation and improving the quality of women’s work only receives limited 
attention in the British debate, despite the set up of the Women and Equality Unit and 
the appointment of a Minister of Equality. A respondent reports:  
 
“The UK the government does not see women’s skills as a problem [.] They are not 
concerned about part-time versus full-time work for women..” (Interview; EOC). 
 
However, this is not only of concern to female employees, as another British 
respondent reports that the overall aim of the British welfare to work strategy is to get 
people into work no matter the type and quality of the job (Interview; government 
official). It is therefore difficult to assess whether key actors perceptions are changing 
in Britain with respect to these elements of gender equality.  
 
Overall the national policies and debates regarding equal opportunities policies 
indicate that to a varying degree key actors have started to address more general 
gender equality issues. However, it is evident that the national attempts to mobilise 
the female workforce have primarily focused on policies regarding reconciliation of 
work and family life rather than equal opportunities policies, which are essential to 
achieve a dual-earner society. Therefore, the low profile of the equal opportunities 
agenda indicates that national governments have not managed to legitimise the dual-
earner discourse and therefore have failed to create incentives for a successful 
mobilisation of the female workforce. 
 
5 Conclusion:  
Mobilising the female workforce has been a political goal of national governments 
and the EU since the early 1990’s. To reach this goal, a set of new policies has been 
implemented under the broad headings of “work-life balance policies” and “equal 
opportunities policies”. Several approaches have been used depending on national 
traditions, resulting in a range of ways of tackling barriers to female employment, 
which often tend to follow regime types. Indeed, the reforms signify a move away 
from the male breadwinner model and may even represent a gradual convergence 
across Europe, as national services are improving in a way that may change the 
current perception of welfare regimes. Universal childcare services have been 
introduced in all four countries for certain age groups, new entitlements for fathers 
have been implemented and the concept of women as workers versus housewives is 
changing, as part of national attempts to mobilise the female workforce. However, the 
different employment patterns of women in Spain, Sweden, Germany and the UK 
imply that not all governments have been equally successful in removing barriers to 
female employment.  
 
Many Spanish mothers still remain outside the labour market; British and German 
mothers continue to work mainly part-time; while Scandinavian women often work 
full-time during periods of child rearing. An important reason for this is the national 
variations in parental leave entitlements, social transfers and levels of care services in 
the four countries, which still are distinct despite recent work-life balance reforms in 
Spain, Germany, the UK and Sweden. Indeed, Sweden continues to have the most 
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generous system in terms of such services while the childcare services in Germany 
and the UK lack behind and the social transfers are poorly in Spain and the UK 
compared to Germany and Sweden. Similarly, equal opportunities policies such as 
social rights to parental leave, elimination of gender pay gaps and gender segregation 
as well as gender mainstreaming are the most advanced in Sweden despite recent 
reforms. Paternity leave is still a non-statutory right in Germany while new paternity 
rights have been implemented in Spain, the UK and most generously in Sweden. The 
UK has hardly addressed the problems of gender pay gaps and gender segregation, 
while such issues have to some degree dominated the Swedish, German and Spanish 
political agenda.  
 
Despite recent attempts to advance social justice by promoting equal opportunities 
policies for men and women in the labour market and informal care sector such 
policies has received much less attention than work-life balance issues. Indeed, the 
analysis showed that it is mainly policies driven by economic concerns, which enable 
women rather than men to reconcile work and family life that predominates the 
political agenda. National governments’ failure to transform key actors’ perceptions 
from the traditional gender division to a dual-earner society proves important with 
respect to the low profile of equal opportunities policies. The analysis reflected that 
mental barriers had a crucial impact on the political process. It was mainly employers 
and to some extent right wing political parties who opposed reforms promoting equal 
rights for men and women, partly because of traditional attitudes regarding gender 
division and partly due to financial concerns. However, the structure of the national 
political systems enabled in particular British New Labour to ignore parliamentary 
opposition. The success of the German, Swedish and to some extent the Spanish 
government to adopt policies of equal opportunities depended on support from the 
opposition due to their national traditions and political systems. The opposition of 
employers were more difficult for national governments to ignore. Indeed, employers 
were to a varying degree veto-points in the political debates, particularly with respect 
to the introduction of new social rights for men and women, the proposed 
improvements of financial incentives for fathers to take a more active role in childcare 
and the gender equality policies. The political debate indicates therefore that a change 
of key actors’ perception of gender roles proves crucial to implement new women-
friendly polices, as powerful key actors can prevent new reforms from being adopted 
if they oppose them.  
 
The political debates indicate that the current transformation towards a dual-earner 
society is only in its early stages despite national attempts to mobilise the female 
workforce. Mainly, because national governments have been unable to promote the 
normative arguments, which legitimise a dual-earner discourse through a 
transformation of key actors’ perceptions from the male breadwinner model to a dual-
earner society. As a result, national reforms continue to some degree to follow the 
logic of the male breadwinner model, as they lack incentives for families to employ a 
more equal gender division. Indeed, this shows a trade off between national 
governments’ political goal of fully mobilising the female workforce and their 
national policies, partly because their work-life balance policies tend to support 
women as carers rather than workers, and partly because less attention is paid to 
men’s rights and potential role in informal childcare. Therefore, national governments 
have only been able promote the cognitive arguments, which justify their attempts to 
enhance women’s participation in paid work and legitimise their used work-life 
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balance policies. They have failed to legitimise the dual-earner discourse by 
demonstrating it appropriateness in terms of transforming national values. For that 
reason, recent reforms do not represent a radical change of national policy discourse 
towards a dual-earner society. It is merely a discourse, which relegates women to live 
a role of secondary rather than equal worker, despite the fact that the importance of 
equal opportunities policies is becoming apparent in the political debates.  
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Table 1: Gender and Labour Market Participation for Women and Men  - Participation 
of those aged 15-64 as % of relevant population, ranged after welfare regime type 
 Total Employment Part-time 
employment rate 
Employment rate 
for Carers aged 
20-49 of Children 
under 15 
Part-time 
employment of 
mothers with 
children under 6 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Women 
 1970 2002 1970 2002 2002 2002 1998 1998 2001 
Nordic regime          
Denmark 92 80.2 58 72.6 10.3 23.0 93 77 6.1 
Finland 83 69.2 61 66.1 7.5 14.8 83 58 .. 
Sweden 89 76.3 59 73.4 7.5 20.6 .. .. .. 
          
Conservative 
regime 
         
Germany 93 71.6 48 59.0 5.5 35.3 92 62 57.1 
Austria 84 75.3 49 61.1 3.1 26.2 98 65 50.4 
Belgium 84 68.1 40 51.1 6.0 32.4 87 55 45.0 
France 87 68.1 49 54.3 5.2 24.1 88 57 36.7 
Netherlands 83b 81.5 31b 64.7 14.7 58.8 97 66 69.4 
Luxembourg .. 75.5 .. 51.5 2.3 28.1   .. 
          
Southern 
regime 
         
Portugal 88a 75.7 54a 60.8 5.7 14.4 98 66 11 
Spain 96 73.9 29 44.9 2.4 16.3 87 40 19.4 
Italy 87 69.2 34 42.0 4.9 23.5 93 42 25 
Greece 86 71.7 31 42.7 2.9 10.0 98 52 8 
          
Liberal regime          
United 
Kingdom 
94 78.9 51 66.3 8.9 40.1 87 69 66.4 
Ireland 96 74.7 34 55.2 7.2 33.2 83 47 .. 
          
EU 15 89 72.9 45. 55.7 6.1 30.0  90 57  
 
Sources:  OECD Labour Force Statistics 1970-1990, OECD Paris Eurostat (2002a) Tables A.20, A21; 
ECHP 1998 data, Calculated from OECD (2003)c, 2002, SS4. 
Notes: a: 1980; b: 1975; c: 1998; d: 1997; e: 1999; EU Labour Force Survey.  
Notes : carers are defined as individuals aged 20-49 looking after children under 15. 
 
 
Table: 2 Female employment by occupation 
 Legislators 
and 
managers 
Profession
als 
Technic
ians 
Clerks Services 
and Sales 
workers 
Belgium 8 24 10 24 16 
Denmark 3 13 26 16 25 
Germany 3.6 11.3 27.6 19.8 20 
Greece 6.9 15.9 8.6 16.4 18.3 
Spain 66.4 16.1 11.5 15.3 23.1 
France 66 9.4 20.3 23.3 20.8 
Ireland 11.3 21.1 6.1 23.7 24.1 
Italy 1.8 15.6 17.6 20.3 21.0 
Luxembourg 2.7 16 18.7 24 17.3 
Netherlands 7.3 17.5 21.8 19.5 20 
Austria 5 11.6 15.9 21.4 22 
Portugal 4.7 9.1 7.3 13 19.8 
Finland 4.8 16.4 18.7 13.9 25.4 
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Sweden 3 18.6 20.5 15.2 29.5 
UK 9.8 11.8 13 24.9 26 
EU 15 5.7 13 19 20.5 22 
       Source: European Labour Force Survey, 2002, table 18 selected categories. 
 
 
Table 3: Overview of different types in Changes in national policy discourses and 
programmes 
Change in policy 
discourse and policy 
programme 
First order change: 
Renew the policy 
discourse and 
programme 
Second order Change; 
Recast the policy 
discourse and 
programme 
New third order 
change 
Revolutionary change 
of policy discourse and 
programme 
Policy instruments: Changed Changed Changed 
Policy Objectives: Same Changed Changed 
Policy core: Same Same Changed 
Sources: Schmidt (2002) p. 223. 
 
Table 4: Recent reforms in the UK, Germany, Sweden and Spain with respect 
parental leaves, flexible working and part-time work 
 UK Germany Sweden  Spain 
Policy 
Instruments: 
    
Maternity 
leave: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pay: Rose from £75 
to £100 per week 
Paid leave: Extended 
from 18 to 26 weeks  
Unpaid leave: 
Changed from 29 
weeks that starts 
from actual week of 
birth to 26 weeks 
starting at end paid 
maternity leave 
No changes: still 14 
weeks paid leave. 
 
 
 
No changes: Still min. 7 
weeks paid. 
 
Maternity pay: 100 
per cent of salary 
for working 
mothers covered 
by the social 
security system 
Paid leave: 
extended from XX 
to 16 weeks  
Paternity leave: 
 
Pay:  £100 
Paid leave: Two 
weeks 
 
No rights for 
paternity leave 
 
 
No changes: still 10 days 
paid leave at birth of child 
plus two months. Same pay 
rate as parental leave.  
Paid leave: two 
days plus a 
possible transfer of 
4 weeks maternity 
leave to the father 
Parental 
Leave: 
 
Unpaid leave: a right 
to 13 weeks for both 
parents 
Parental pay:  income 
ceiling increased to 
XX. Specific benefit 
to parents taking less 
than 1 years leave 
Paid leave; changed 
to an individual right. 
Both parents can take 
up to three years 
leaveS. Entitlement 
to work during leave: 
extended from 19 to 
30 hours per week.  
Pay: decreased from 90 % to 
80  % of income; Income 
ceiling: 24.000 SEK, min. 
from £6.1 to £13.2 per day 
Paid leave: prolonged from 
12 to 13 months in which 60 
days are reserved for each 
parent and rest (9 months) 
can be divided among 
parents as they wish.  
Entitlement to work part-
time during parental leave 
Unpaid leave: up 
to three years, but 
if working only 
one parent is 
entitled to this 
benefit.  
Emergency 
leave: 
Unpaid leave: for a 
reasonable amount of 
time to care for sick 
child or older 
dependant 
Paid leave for 10 
days a year. 
Emergency pay: decreased 
from 90 to 80% of income. 
Paid leave: changed from 90 
to 120 days p.a. for both 
fathers and mothers 
Unpaid leave 
Flexible 
working: 
A right to request 
flexible working to 
parents with children 
under six 
A right to part-time 
work 
No changes: Still A request to 
reduce working-
time if caring for a 
child under six.   
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Sources: Treaury/DTI (2003), p. 26-27; Salido, 2002, p. 23; International reform monitor, 1999, 
Bönker & Aust, forthcoming; Bradshaw & Finch, 2002; Timonen, 2003, p. 27. 
 
 
Table 5: Recent reforms regarding social transfers in the UK, Germany, Sweden 
and Spain   
 
 UK Germany Sweden  Spain 
Benefits  Rising child 
benefit from 
€112 to 
€154  
 An €100 allowance to all 
working mothers  
An allowance of € 1.200 
for women giving birth to 
a third child 
Tax 
Credits 
Working tax credit: 
Thresholds:  
Child tax credit:  
available to 
families with 
children: 
thresholds: amount 
  Tax exemptions for 
people caring for 
dependant and young 
children under 3.  
Minimum family income 
based on tax reductions 
Childcare 
support  
Childcare tax 
credit: paid to 
working parents: 
thresholds: 
Tax 
deductions 
for childcare 
expenses 
Thresholds for the 
means-tested subsidized 
childcare increased 
from 700 to 1140 SEK 
Means- tested  
childcare allowance 
 
Sources: Treaury/DTI (2003), Salido, 2002,; International reform monitor, 1999, Bönker & Aust, 
forthcoming; Bradshaw & Finch, 2002; Timonen, 2003, p. 27. 
 
Table 6: Recent Childcare reforms in the UK, Germany, Sweden, Spain and EU 
 UK Germany Sweden Spain  EU 
Policy 
Instruments 
     
Targets 2006:  1.25 million 
childcare places 
2004: Free part-
time nursery place 
for all 3 and 4 year 
olds  
2010: 20 per 
cent more 
childcare 
places for 
children under 
3 
7 per cent 
rise in 
female 
employment 
rate  
2004: 240.000 
new childcare 
places  
2010: 90 per cent 
of all children 
aged 3 to 
mandatory  
school age and 
30 percent of 
children under 3 
in childcare 
Childcare 
programme 
National Childcare 
Care Strategy: 
aimed at 
improving 
childcare services 
 
Sure Start 
programmes; 
aimed at childcare 
in deprived areas 
 
Free nursery place 
for all 3 and 4 year  
Education and 
care 
programme; 
aimed at 
improving 
childcare 
services  
 
Free part-time 
preschool 
education for 
all 3-6 year 
olds 
Free 
preschool 
education 
for all four 
and five year 
olds 
Free preschool 
education for 
all 3-6 year 
olds. 
 
Quality of 
Teaching law; 
aimed at 
harmonising 
national 
childcare 
services 
 
 
Policy goal: Mobilise female 
workforce 
Mobilise 
female 
workforce 
Mobilise 
female 
workforce 
Mobilise 
female 
workforce 
Mobilise female 
workforce 
Sources: Treasury/DTI 2003; Bönker, Aust & Hellman, 2003; European Commission (2002), p.14; 
Vidal & Valls, 2002, p.25-26; International reform Monitor, 2001.  
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